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Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of
Indigenous Identity in Sentencing
Jeanette Gevikoglu*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. Ipeelee/
Ladue1 is an opportunity to revisit the critiques of R. v. Gladue2 and to
consider whether the sentencing of indigenous offenders under section
718.2(e) of the Criminal Code3 is the best means to alleviate the
historical injustice and systemic discrimination indigenous people
associate with the criminal justice system. The law has always
distinguished indigenous people from other Canadians on the basis of
their identity. For instance, defined benefits flow from the meaning of
“Indian” within the meaning of the Indian Act4 and constitutional rights
flow from the meaning of “aboriginal” in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.5 Indigenous identity certainly has come to matter in the
criminal justice system, which articulates particular accommodation for
“Aboriginal” offenders when determining a fit sentence in accordance

*
Jeanette Gevikoglu is a lawyer at the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. This work was
prepared separately from the author’s employment responsibilities at the Public Prosecution Service of
Canada. The views, opinions and conclusions expressed herein are personal to the author and should
not be construed as those of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada or the federal Crown.
1
[2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee/Ladue”].
2
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”].
3
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”].
4
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. See, e.g., Indian Act, id.; Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.J. No. 5,
[1939] S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1971] F.C.J. No. 28, 22 D.L.R.
(3d) 188 (F.C.A.); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J.
No. 14, 291 Man. R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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with section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.6 In Ipeelee/Ladue, the
Supreme Court revisits section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and
considers its application to the sentencing of indigenous offenders
breaching long-term supervision orders (“LTOs”). The Court reaffirms its
decision in R. v. Gladue and ultimately both Ladue and Ipeelee receive
consideration for their status as indigenous offenders.
On its face, Ipeelee/Ladue may be considered a success for advocates
for indigenous offenders. Specifically, the decision means that the principles the Court articulated in Gladue are a mitigating factor in sentencing
indigenous offenders, even those who breach an LTO. Although the narrow issue is important, more interesting is how the Court construes
indigenous identity in the sentencing of indigenous offenders. The criminal law, as Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrates, uniquely particularizes
indigenous identity as a factor that must have weight in sentencing indigenous offenders — regardless of the offence, the victim, or the link
between the offender and his or her indigenous community. The decision
demonstrates the dilemma courts face in their efforts to remedy the historic injustice and systemic discrimination indigenous people suffered in
the criminal justice system through accommodating indigenous difference. Ipeelee/Ladue shows that the Court is mindful of the challenges
adjudicating indigenous offenders’ claim to historical disadvantage and
systemic discrimination pose. The decision does little, however, to probe
how sentencing law plays a part in constructing indigenous identity in
the law and what that means to the goal of 718.2(e): the mitigation of the
historic injustice and systemic discrimination that makes up part of the
indigenous experience of criminal law. Although the response to the decision has renewed interest in the practicalities of sentencing indigenous
offenders, it remains one confined to solutions within the framework of
criminal law rather than a broader consideration of indigenous communities’ relationship with the state.
To explore the implications of particularizing indigenous identity in
Gladue, it is important to consider the facts of the case, which I set out in
the next part of this paper. Then, I place Ipeelee/Ladue within context as
the most recent decision in a line of jurisprudence and legislative
initiatives aimed at remedying indigenous communities’ negative
experience of the criminal justice system. Next, I consider how
6
Note that for the purpose of s. 718.2(e), the meaning of “aboriginal” is broader than the
Indian Act and includes “at least, all who come within the scope of s. 25 of the Charter and s. 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982”: Gladue, supra, note 2, at para. 90.
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Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrates that making use of indigenous identity in
sentencing poses a conundrum for the criminal justice system. I conclude
by considering whether there is a way to confront the conundrum of
indigenous identity in sentencing.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF IPEELEE/LADUE
The background of the offenders and the offences at issue in
Ipeelee/Ladue are familiar to many criminal lawyers working in indigenous communities. Both Manasie Ipeelee and Frank Ladue were
sentenced to penitentiary sentences and designated long-term offenders
subject to an LTO upon their release. A long-term offender designation is
given to individuals convicted of certain enumerated offences or a “serious personal injury offence”7 whom the court deems likely to re-offend
based on evidence offered during sentencing (such as a psychiatric assessment or criminal history). If a sentencing court finds an individual to
be a “long-term offender”, it imposes an LTO of up to 10 years after the
individual completes his or her penitentiary sentence, during which that
individual is under the jurisdiction of the parole board.
1. Manasie Ipeelee
Manasie Ipeelee, an Inuit offender, was living in the Kingston area
bound by an LTO. He was born in Iqaluit, Nunavut. His mother was an
alcoholic and died of exposure when Ipeelee was quite young. He began
consuming alcohol at the age of 11 and became an alcoholic. He alleged
he was sexually abused as a child. Ipeelee was raised by his grandparents, but at the time of his LTO hearing he was estranged from his family
in Iqaluit. Many close members of his family had died while he was in
custody on previous sentences. Ipeelee was living in the Kingston area
because there was no Community Correctional Centre in Nunavut that
could accept him.8

7

A “serious personal injury offence” is defined in s. 752 of the Criminal Code and
includes certain enumerated offences, like sexual assault, as well as offences a court finds “use or
attempt use of violence” and/or involves “conduct that endangered or is likely to endanger life,
safety of another person or inflict or is likely to inflict severe psychological harm”.
8
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at paras. 2-3; R. v. Ipeelee, [2009] O.J. No. 5402, 99 O.R.
(3d) 419, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee CA”]; see also the appellant’s and
respondent’s factums filed in Ipeelee/Ladue online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>.
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In 1999 Ipeelee committed the predicate offence resulting in the imposition of the LTO in Yellowknife when he violently sexually assaulted
a 50-year-old homeless woman. He served the entirety of his six-year
sentence for that offence and commenced his LTO in March 2007. Prior
to the charges for breaching his LTO that brought his case to the Supreme
Court, Ipeelee’s LTO had been suspended four times. In August 2008, the
Kingston police found him riding a bicycle, intoxicated, and also possessing two bottles of alcohol. He was charged with breaching a
condition of his LTO that required abstention from alcohol. He pleaded
guilty to that offence on November 14, 2008 and was sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment. At his sentencing, the judge found his Aboriginal
status to be of diminished importance in the context of the case, a determination that formed one of the grounds of Ipeelee’s appeal to the
Ontario Court of Appeal, who upheld the sentence. The Ontario Court of
Appeal agreed that the sentencing judge should have taken Ipeelee’s Inuit
status into account, but found that the sentence was nonetheless fit.9
Ipeelee subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
2. Frank Ladue
Frank Ladue is a member of the Ross River Dena Council Band in
Yukon Territory, part of the Kaska nation. Ladue’s parents had problems
with alcohol abuse and died when he was young; his mother may have
been murdered. He was raised by his grandparents, who lived a traditional life on the land. From the age of five until nine, he attended
residential school, where he alleged he was the subject of abuse. The experience of residential school for members of the Ross River Dena
community was documented in the pre-sentence report tendered at Ladue’s sentencing. Much like Manasie Ipeelee, his criminal record was
related to intoxicants, and he began using illicit drugs while in the federal
penitentiary. He was characterized as a “serial sex offender”.10
Ladue was convicted of break and enter and sexual assault in 2002
when he sexually assaulted a 22-year-old woman passed out in a house.
He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a seven-year LTO.

9

Ipeelee CA, id.
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at paras. 19-25; R. v. Ladue, [2011] B.C.J. No. 366, [2011]
2 C.N.L.R. 277, at paras. 5-11 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ladue CA”]; R. v. Ladue [2010] B.C.J.
No. 2824, 2010 BCPC, at paras. 18-23 (B.C.P.C.) [hereinafter “Ladue PC”]; see also appellant’s and
respondent’s factums filed in Ipeelee/Ladue online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca>.
10
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His LTO commenced in December 2006. It was suspended three times,
and he had just finished serving a sentence for one of these suspensions
in August 2009 when he was arrested on an outstanding DNA warrant.
As a result of that arrest, he lost his place in Linkage House, a placement
in Kamloops where he received the support of an indigenous elder, and
was released instead to Belkin House in downtown Vancouver. Shortly
after that placement in Vancouver, he provided a urinalysis that tested
positive for cocaine. He pleaded guilty to breaching his LTO in February
2010 and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, a sentence longer
than the 18 months to two years requested by the Crown. Ladue appealed
his sentence on the basis that the sentencing judge failed to consider his
Aboriginal status. The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
allowed his appeal, reducing the sentence to one year. Justice Chaisson,
in dissent in the result, would have imposed a sentence of two years. The
Attorney General of British Columbia appealed to the Supreme Court.11
3. Ipeelee/Ladue in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court heard Ipeelee’s and Ladue’s cases together. Justice LeBel, writing for the majority, allowed Ipeelee’s appeal, reducing
his sentence to one year. Similarly, the majority dismissed the appeal of
the Attorney General of British Columbia and upheld the decision of the
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to reduce Ladue’s sentence to one year. Justice Rothstein dissented on the question of whether
protection of the public was the paramount principle in sentencing individuals who breach LTOs, but he agreed with the majority’s approach to
sentencing indigenous offenders. Justice Rothstein also dissented in the
result, finding both appeals should have been dismissed.
The decision reviews the principles of sentencing in the Criminal
Code and the provisions of the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act12 that govern LTOs. In particular, it reviews how judges should approach the determination of a fit sentence for indigenous offenders who
breach LTOs.13 The decision was critical of the line of LTO-breach sentencing decisions that emphasized protection of the public over
rehabilitation of offenders.14 It was apparent from the decision and the
11
12
13
14

Ipeelee/Ladue, id.; Ladue CA, id., at paras. 13-15; Ladue PC, id., at paras. 13-25.
S.C. 1992, c. 20.
Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at para. 34.
Id., at paras. 49-54.
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questions directed at counsel during the hearing of the appeal, that the
Court was concerned with the possibility that lengthy penitentiary sentences for an LTO would effectively convert that LTO into a dangerous
offender designation.15 The Court did not decide the case merely on that
basis, however. The decision goes on to re-examine the principles that
should govern the sentencing of indigenous offenders and applies them
to the case.
Justice LeBel revisited Gladue and the legislative history of 718.2(e)
of the Criminal Code, which requires specific consideration of the circumstances of indigenous offenders. He considers and dismisses
critiques of Gladue and ultimately reaffirms the need to consider Aboriginal status in sentencing. He attempts to “make sense of aboriginal
sentencing” and evaluate the existing approach to sentencing of indigenous offenders.16 He then applies the principles discussed to Ipeelee’s
and Ladue’s circumstances. The Court finds that in sentencing Ipeelee,
the lower courts erred in principle by making protection of the public the
paramount principle of sentencing and giving attenuated consideration to
Ipeelee’s status as an Inuit offender. It concludes that, given Ipeelee’s
history of drinking since age 11, “relapse is to be expected as [Ipeelee]
continues to address his addiction”.17 With respect to Ladue, the Court
determined that the judgment of the majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal was “well founded” and that the court was correct to
intervene on the basis that inadequate consideration was given to Ladue’s
status as an indigenous offender.18

III. WHY THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF
INDIGENOUS OFFENDERS?
The Court’s reasoning in Ipeelee/Ladue reflects an approach to
sentencing indigenous offenders that makes use of those offenders’
indigenous identity. The concern with indigenous identity stems from
Canada’s troubled history of accommodating indigenous difference,
especially in the criminal justice system. That troubled history provides
important context for understanding how Ipeelee/Ladue is both an
15
Id., at para. 37; Hearing of Ipeelee/Ladue, Supreme Court Webcast, online: <http://scccsc.gc.ca.>.
16
Ipeelee/Ladue, id., at paras. 64-79.
17
Id., at para. 92.
18
Id., at para. 97.
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affirmation of 718.2(e) and by extension provides a place for Canada’s
indigenous people in the criminal justice system. Section 718.2(e)
requires judges to consider the “particular circumstances of indigenous
offenders”. The amendment came about as a result of advocacy by and on
behalf of indigenous people that sought to curb over-incarceration of
indigenous offenders and to mitigate the historical disadvantage and
systemic discrimination offenders experienced in the criminal justice
system.
Indigenous offenders make up a disproportionate number of those
incarcerated in Canada’s prisons, a fact most recently confirmed in the
report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator.19 Various reports
commissioned by parliamentary, legislative or committee inquiries
document this indigenous experience and characterize the Canadian
criminal justice system as a failure for indigenous people.20 These critiques of the criminal justice system tend to revolve around: (1) overrepresentation of indigenous Canadians in the criminal justice system,
particularly in jails;21 (2) failure of the criminal justice system to deal
with the social and economic dislocation that is often related to crime;22
19
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters: Aboriginal People and the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act (October 22, 2012), online: <http://www.ocibec.gc.ca/rpt/oth-aut/oth-aut20121022-eng.aspx>.
20
See, e.g., Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada,
1991) [hereinafter “RCAP”]; A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice
Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991) [hereinafter “Manitoba Justice Inquiry”];
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal
People and the Criminal Justice System in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services
Canada, 1996) [hereinafter “Bridging the Cultural Divide”]; Richard Gosse, Roger Carter & James
Youngblood Henderson, Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest: Presentations Made at a
Conference on Aboriginal Peoples and Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1994) [hereinafter
“Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest”]; Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the
Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The
Task Force on the Criminal Justice System, 1991).
21
See, e.g., Bridging the Cultural Divide, id., at 28-33; Larry Chartrand & Celeste McKay,
A Review of Research on Criminal Victimization and First Nations, Metis, and Inuit Peoples
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2006), online: Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2006/rr06_vic1/index.html>; “Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics Profile Series:
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada” (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 2001), at 6-11; Manitoba Justice
Inquiry, id.
22
See, e.g., Rick Linden, “Crime Prevention in Aboriginal Communities”, Consultation
Paper for Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991);
Murray Sinclair, “Aboriginal Peoples, Justice, and the Law” [hereinafter “Sinclair”] in Continuing
Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest, supra, note 20, at 173-75; Dawn Y. Andersen, After Gladue: Are
Judges Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders Differently? (Ph. D. Dissertation: York University, 2003),
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(3) lack of indigenous perspectives in the criminal justice system; and
(4) the sense of illegitimacy and oppression most indigenous Canadians
associate with the criminal justice system.23
The numerous government inquiries and reports into the failure of
the Canadian criminal justice system for indigenous people also direct
criticism at the lack of political power and legal authority indigenous
communities suffer in their experience of criminal justice. The reports of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Manitoba Justice
Inquiry, in particular, called on the federal government to respond to the
charge that the criminal justice system fails indigenous people in Canada.24 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People’s report on criminal
justice outlined how the criminal justice system accounted for part of the
historic disadvantage and oppression indigenous people in Canada have
suffered.25 The Commission rejected “indigenization”26 of the criminal
justice system, which was already taking place with court workers and
diversion, and any reform that targeted cultural awareness without
changing the political framework of the criminal justice system.27 The
Manitoba Justice Inquiry recommended that the federal government support the establishment of indigenous systems of justice to empower
indigenous communities and to ensure that the criminal justice system
applies indigenous law.28 About the criminal justice system, the late
Patricia Monture once commented, “[t]he legal system is at the heart of

at 2 and 5 [hereinafter “Andersen”]; Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: the Judicial and
Political Reception of a Promising Decision” (July 2000) Can. J. Crim. 355, at 358-59 [hereinafter
“Roach & Rudin”]; Sanjeev Anand, “The Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders, Continued Confusion
and Persistent Problems: A Comment on the Decision in R. v. Gladue” (July 2000) Can. J. Crim.
412, at 416 [hereinafter “Anand”].
23
See, e.g., Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note 20, at xi, 7; Sinclair, id.; Patricia
Monture, “Thinking About Aboriginal Justice: Myths and Revolution” [hereinafter “Monture”] in
Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest, supra, note 20, at 222; Roach & Rudin, id., at 376.
24
Andersen, supra, note 22, at 5-6; Roach & Rudin, id., at 358, 379.
25
David Stack, “The Impact of Gladue on the Judiciary: Bringing Aboriginal Perspectives
into the Courtroom” (1999) 62:2 Sask. L. Rev. 471, at 477; Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note
20, at 1-25.
26
Indigenization refers to the practice of maintaining state and post-colonial structures but
with indigenous staff and programs. For example, Tammy Landau describes the indigenization of
corrections practices: “where Aboriginal workers (for example, probation and parole officers) and
programs (for example, sweat lodges and healing circles) are integrated into existing correctional
practices, either at the institutional or community level”. See Tammy C. Landau, “Plus Ca Change?:
Correcting Inuit Inmates in Nunavut, Canada” (2006) 45:2 The Howard Journal 191.
27
Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra, note 20, at 40-53.
28
See the recommendations for Aboriginal justice systems in Chapter 17 of the report of the
Manitoba Justice Inquiry: Manitoba Justice Inquiry, supra, note 20.
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what we must reject as aboriginal nations and Aboriginal individuals”.29
Monture advocated for indigenous people in Canada to be given “both
the resources and the control to address the many problems that our
communities now face”. She was fierce in advocating that indigenous
people be allowed to apply those resources and that control in accordance
with indigenous legal traditions.30 Thus, it is partly as a result of advocacy
for political power and authority that section 718.2(e) was born.
Section 718.2(e) came into effect in 1996 when Bill C-41 amended the
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code. The comprehensive amendments included an expression of principles and purposes to direct judges in
sentencing, as well as new sentencing options and rules of evidence for
sentencing hearings. The principles and purposes of sentencing reflected in
sections 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code were intended to codify existing
judicial principles of sentencing and emphasize more the remedial aspects
of the rationale for sentencing.31 Bill C-41 signalled “Parliament’s interest
in the restorative justice objectives of reparation for harm done to victims
and the community and in promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders
and the harm done to victims in the community”.32
Most important for indigenous communities was that the reforms
added section 718.2(e), requiring “particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders” in the consideration of “all available
sanctions other than imprisonment”. The particular attention Parliament
directed at indigenous offenders in 718.2(e) reflected the concerns about
the over-representation of indigenous offenders in the Canadian criminal
justice system. At the first meeting of the Standing Committee hearings
on Bill C-41, the Hon. Allan Rock, then Minister of Justice, spoke to the
Committee about section 718.2(e):
The reason we referred specifically there to aboriginal persons is that
they are sadly overrepresented in the prison populations of Canada. ...
Nationally, aboriginal persons represent about 2 percent of Canada’s

29

Monture, supra, note 23, at 223.
Id., at 224.
31
Department of Justice, Backgrounder on Sentencing Reform (August 28, 1996), online:
Department of Justice <http://web.archive.bibalex.org/web/19980116184537/canada.justice.gc.ca/
News/Communiques/1996/chap22_bkg_en.html>; Andrew Welsh & James Ogloff, “Progressive
Reform or Maintaining the Status Quo?: An Empirical Evaluation of the Judicial Consideration of
Aboriginal Status in Sentencing Decisions” (July 2008) Can. J. of Crim. 491, at 493.
32
David Daubney & Gordon Parry, “An Overview of Bill C-41 (The Sentencing Reform
Act)” in Julian V. Roberts & David P. Cole, eds., Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1999) 31, at 34.
30
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population, but they represent 10.6 percent of persons in prison.
Obviously, there’s a problem here.
What we’re trying to do, particularly having regard to the initiatives in
the aboriginal justice communities to achieve community justice, is to
encourage courts to look at alternatives where it’s consistent with
33
protection of the public — alternatives to jail. ...

The reports on sentencing leading up to Bill C-41 supported creating
alternatives to imprisonment for indigenous offenders. The Law Reform
Commission specifically supported diversion measures, victim-offender
reconciliation for indigenous offenders, and codifying the recommendation for diversion. The basis for those recommendations was the premise
that “rehabilitation and reconciliation are important for aboriginal communities”.34 As Sanjeev Anand writes, “it is indisputable that
s. 718.2(e)’s purpose is to help ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage
sentencing judges, where appropriate, to have recourse to a restorative
approach to sentencing”.35 Thus, section 718.2(e) symbolized a constitutional and socio-legal compromise: a space within the criminal justice
system for indigenous legal approaches.
In practice, however, section 718.2(e) functions primarily in criminal
courts applying Canadian criminal law. The Criminal Code does not specify
what constitutes “particular circumstances of aboriginal offenders”. That
task has been left to the courts, particularly sentencing judges. The Supreme Court has defined the “particular circumstances of aboriginal
offenders” in a way that relies on the notion of indigenous difference and
considers indigenous identity a factor to be negotiated and accommodated

33

House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144,
No. I-62 (November 17, 1994) (Hon. Allan Rock). It is worth noting that the First Nations
communities appearing before the Standing Committee discussed how they viewed s. 718.2(e) as a
tool to develop Aboriginal justice systems: House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in Official Report of Debates
(Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, No. I-79 (February 14, 1995) (Blaine Favel); House of
Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, No. I-88 (March 2,
1995) (Ovide Mercredi).
34
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal
Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1991), at 70; Michael Jackson, “In Search of the Pathways to Justice: Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Aboriginal Communities” (1992) 26 U.B.C. L. Rev. 141, at 170-87 [hereinafter “Jackson”].
35
Anand, supra, note 22, at 416.
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in the sentencing process, as Gladue and Ipeelee/Ladue demonstrate.
That is why indigenous difference mattered for Manasie Ipeelee and
Frank Ladue. Their identity as indigenous offenders is the rationale for
taking into account their particular circumstances in sentencing.
Ipeelee/Ladue is an example of how criminal courts are called on daily to
remedy the historic disadvantage and systemic discrimination that led to
the implementation of section 718.2(e) in the first place. The case reveals
that, in practice, performing that task creates a new framework for criminal law’s differential treatment of indigenous offenders.

IV. A COURTROOM CONUNDRUM: IPEELEE/LADUE AND
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 718.2(e)
Using individual identity as a factor in sentencing is not unique to
indigeneity. Sentencing is a process that requires law take up the question
of individual identity, always assessing and evaluating the quality of the
individual, “the circumstances of the offender”, and weighing them
against the crime before the court, “the circumstances of the offence”.36
If an individual’s circumstances are always before a sentencing judge,
why then should the mandated consideration of indigenous identity concern us? It should concern us because the concept of indigenous identity
has already been mobilized by the state and the criminal justice system in
ways we decry as harmful.
The law was a tool in colonialism. To this day, legal language defines
indigeneity: “Indian”, “Eskimo”. The law criminalized indigenous political and cultural activities, and regulated who could take up land, attend
school or access government resources.37 In remote areas of the country,
criminal justice was often the first and most dominant aspect of the

36

Criminal Code, supra, note 3, Part XXIII.
See, e.g, Sidney L. Harring, White Man’s Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century
Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, University of
Toronto Press, 1998); Amanda Nettelback & Russel Smandych, “Policing Indigenous Peoples on
Two Colonial Frontiers: Australia’s Mounted Police and Canada’s North-West Mounted Police”
(2010) 43:2 Aus. Crim. N.Z. J. of Criminology 356 [hereinafter “Nettelback & Smandych”]; Martin
Friedland, A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the Development of Canadian Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1984), at 47-49; Barry Wright, “Criminal Law Codification and Imperial
Projects: The Self-Governing Jurisdiction Codes of the 1890s” (2008) 12 Legal Hist. 19, at 20,
29-30, 31-37; “Rewriting Histories of the Land: Colonization and Indigenous Resistance in Eastern
Canada” in Sheren H. Razack, ed., Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002).
37
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Canadian state with which indigenous people had contact.38 Articulating
how indigenous communities experience disempowerment and historical
disadvantage in the legal system, John Borrows writes: “[p]ut simply, the
continent’s original inhabitants have never been convinced that the rule
of law lies at the heart of their experiences with others in this land.”39
The legacy of that colonial history remains: the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada, ongoing land claims negotiations, the Idle No
More movement and the disproportionate number of indigenous people
involved with the criminal justice system.
1. Essentializing Indigenous Communities
The way the Court depicts indigenous identity in Ipeelee/Ladue creates a framework for differential treatment of indigenous offenders that is
problematic. The problem is revealed in the way that the Court construes
and then dismisses the critiques of Gladue. The Court is mindful of the
challenges of adjudicating indigenous offenders’ claims to historical disadvantage and systemic discrimination. It engages some critiques of the
application of Gladue, namely that: (1) sentencing is not an appropriate
means of addressing over-representation; (2) the Gladue principles provide what is essentially a race-based discount for Aboriginal offenders;
and (3) the sentences for indigenous offenders are disparate.
Ipeelee/Ladue dismisses these critiques almost out of hand. The Court
pays little attention, for instance, to what effects differentiating offenders
on the basis of indigenous identity has for indigenous communities. The
particularized focus on indigenous identity takes on a character that subsumes other considerations, including differences within indigenous
communities and the purpose behind the implementation of
section 718.2(e). Indeed, it is this particularization with which Rothstein J.,
in part, takes issue, declaring: “Aboriginal communities are not a separate
category entitled to less protection because the offender is Aboriginal.”40
His comment reflects the statistical reality of high crime rates in indigenous communities. Statistics are especially stark in remote communities,
38
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such as Iqaluit, where “the volume and severity of police-reported crime
were found to be highest in the territories, particularly in the Northwest
Territories and Nunavut”.41 The Court does little to address how particularizing indigenous identity as a determinative factor in sentencing —
regardless of the offence, the victim, or the link between the offender and
his or her indigenous community — could create a category of community that receives less protection from the law. If anything, it is
dismissive of the idea, selectively drawing an inflammatory quote from
the legislative history of 718.2(e):
Why should an Aboriginal convicted of murder, rape, assault or of
uttering threats not be liable to imprisonment like any other citizen of
this country? Can we replace all this with a parallel justice, an ethnic
justice, a cultural justice? Where would it stop? Where does this horror
come from?42

Framing the concern about community protection in this manner suggests that intolerance is the source of this critique of Gladue. It ignores
the question of whether indigenous communities themselves have the
impression that they are the subject of “race-based” sentencing. It fails to
consider the indigenous critics and communities that have taken issue
with section 718.2(e) and the approach espoused in Gladue.
The diversity of indigenous communities and their engagement in
sentencing is an unexplored factor in Ipeelee/Ladue. Indigenous communities, which are multiple, varied, rich and diverse in cultural and legal
traditions, are all meant to be encompassed in the reference to “Aboriginal”. The effect essentializes indigenous identity. “Essentialism” refers to
the idea that individuals who share the same characteristics possess a
shared, constant biological nature or essence, or “ascribe to group members a common experience of oppression that is culturally and
historically invariable”.43 Essentialism is especially problematic when
institutions of authority, within and outside a group, define rights and
benefits on the basis of a set of closed characteristics meant to define that
group’s identity.44 Theorists and advocates of identity politics alike have

41
Shannon Brennan, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada”, Juristat, online:
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11692-eng.htm>.
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House of Commons Debates, vol. 133, 1st Sess., 35th Parl., September 20, 1994, at 5876.
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Caroline Dick, Perils of Identity (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), at 30 [hereinafter
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Id., at 30-35.
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wrestled with the issue of essentialism.45 In the context of sentencing
indigenous offenders, essentializing indigenous identity creates a conundrum. Section 718.2(e) was meant to alleviate discrimination and historic
disadvantage. Essentializing indigenous identity, even in the service of
remediating the circumstances of particular offenders, puts the criminal
courts in a quandary. It calls into question whether the implementation of
section 718.2(e) can ever respond to what indigenous advocates and critics of the criminal justice system called for: power and autonomy for
indigenous people in the criminal justice system.
The Court’s characterization of indigenous identity also calls into
question the role the criminal justice system plays for indigenous offenders. The needs of the communities or offenders are constructed in a way
that characterizes the indigenous person being sentenced as victimized
by systemic and direct discrimination, suffering from dislocation, and
substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions.
Ipeelee/Ladue not only makes such comparisons in the case of Frank
Ladue and Manasie Ipeelee,46 but also states:
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability
only follows from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find
themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack
of opportunities and limited options for positive development. While
this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say
that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of
criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances
may diminish their moral culpability.47

Although Ipeelee and Ladue suffered deprivation as individuals, the
Court treats their context not as “circumstances of the offender” in the
same way it might other offenders who lack opportunity or suffer disadvantages. Rather, the Court connects Ipeelee’s and Ladue’s social and
economic deprivations to their identity as indigenous offenders and
moves from that connection to a broader generalization about indigenous
offenders as a category. Section 718.2(e) is of course the foundation for
the differentiation of indigenous offenders, but the Court’s decision still
draws the difference in a way that enforces traditional power imbalances
45
See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Avigail Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009); Dick, id.
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between indigenous people and the state. The Court’s decision has the
effect of inferring diminished moral culpability on an offender by virtue
of his or her indigenous identity. It places indigenous offenders in a similar position as others for whom the assignation of responsibility is a
problem, such as the mentally ill or youth. It is important to consider the
impact that both appropriating indigenous identity and essentializing that
identity as victimized, dislocated and poor has on indigenous communities’ and offenders’ agency in the sentencing process. The state becomes
a kind of trustee for indigenous people, tasked with remedying the disadvantage Gladue describes. The irony is, of course, that part of the
disadvantage indigenous offenders suffered was as a result of past policies and institutions that the state implemented as a self-declared trustee
for indigenous people.
2. Essentializing Indigenous Legal Perspectives: Dismissing the
Concerns of “Race-Based” Sentencing
Ipeelee/Ladue indicates that the Court is aware of the dangers of essentialism, making reference to criticism that refers to section 718.2(e) as
“race-based” sentencing.48 Nonetheless, the Court dismisses this concern.
The dismissal glosses over more profound concerns that critics have expressed regarding the sentencing framework that Gladue laid out for
indigenous offenders. The first concern was that there would be disparate
sentences for indigenous offenders or that less punitive sentences would
endanger the community, as many indigenous communities already suffered from high crime rates.49 The decision also attracted criticism from
feminists who argued that the decision’s emphasis on restorative justice
practice overlooked the gender dimensions of crime and victimization in
Aboriginal communities.50 Finally, it faced the critique that decisions

48

Ipeelee/Ladue, supra, note 1, at para. 71.
Roach & Rudin, supra, note 22; Andersen, supra, note 22. See also the Pauktuutit Inuit
Women Association’s submission to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs: House of
Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs
in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 144, No. I-85 (February 28, 1995)
[hereinafter “Pauktuutit Submission”]
50
See, e.g., Angela Cameron, “R. v. Gladue: Sentencing and the Gendered Impacts of
Colonialism” ) [hereinafter “Cameron”] in John D. Whyte, ed., Moving Toward Justice (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing Ltd., 2008; Emma Larocque, “Re-examining Culturally Appropriate Methods in Criminal
Justice Applications” [hereinafter “Larocque”] in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1997).
49

220

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

made under the framework essentialize indigenous people and indigenous culture in a way that reinforces historical stereotypes.51
The Court essentializes indigenous identity in a way that can perpetuate problematic stereotypes that were the basis for asserting
sovereignty over indigenous people and appropriating indigenous identity in the first place. Ipeelee/Ladue reflects how courts set indigenous
legal perspectives up in opposition to the criminal justice system:
The Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon the
presumption that all offenders and all communities share the same
values when it comes to sentencing and to recognize that, given these
fundamentally different world views, different or alternative sanctions
may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a
particular community.52

The Court thus places indigenous offenders in a position that is in
contrast to the way sentencing principles normally operate in the Criminal Code. Unfortunately, the Court does not suggest that anything about
the Inuit or Dena world view was particularly relevant to the Court’s approach to sentencing repeat sex offenders who breach court orders, like
Ipeelee or Ladue. The Court openly acknowledges that “sentencing will
not be the sole — or even the primary — means of addressing Aboriginal
overrepresentation in penal institutions”; but the Court maintains, quoting Gladue, that sentencing options other than jail can play “a stronger
role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, victim, and community, and in preventing future crime”.53 Ipeelee/Ladue does not, however,
include a discussion of these options. In fact, although making the argument that the consideration of sentencing options need not result in more
lenient custodial sentences, the Court then goes on to find that what is
appropriate for Ipeelee and Ladue is a more lenient custodial sentence.
To determine what the Court means by these different “world
views”, it is perhaps necessary to look to what Gladue articulates about
Aboriginal justice. The Court’s view of the way indigenous identity
should be conceived of in the sentencing process is exemplified in this
excerpt from Gladue:
When evaluating these circumstances in light of the aims and principles
of sentencing as set out in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code and in the
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jurisprudence, the judge must strive to arrive at a sentence which is just
and appropriate in the circumstances. By means of s. 718.2(e),
sentencing judges have been provided with a degree of flexibility and
discretion to consider in appropriate circumstances alternative
sentences to incarceration which are appropriate for the aboriginal
offender and community and yet comply with the mandated principles
and purpose of sentencing. In this way, effect may be given to the
aboriginal emphasis upon healing and restoration of both the victim and
the offender.54

The Court sees indigenous traditions as healing traditions, taking a
firm approach in characterizing indigenous law as primarily restorative.55
The decision describes restorative justice as:
an approach to remedying crime in which it is understood that all things
are interrelated and that crime disrupts the harmony which existed prior
to its occurrence, or at least which it is felt should exist. The
appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely determined by the
needs of the victims, and the community, as well as the offender.56

In this way, a restorative justice approach becomes the indigenous world
view and accordingly part of the Gladue sentencing model.
In the application of Gladue, therefore, indigenous tradition is
formulated and set up in contrast, and even in contradiction, to the unitary
values of the Canadian criminal justice system; Canada’s criminal justice
system is depicted as “retributive” whereas indigenous models of justice
are depicted as “restorative”. Len Sawatsky, for instance, has characterized
the Canadian criminal justice system in exactly such an oppositional way.57
Rupert Ross’s work depicting his understanding of indigenous difference
also relies on the notion that indigenous people have an understanding of
dealing with crime that contradicts principles of the Canadian criminal
justice system.58 Michael Jackson lays out a framework for indigenous
justice systems that parallels the idea that indigenous legal systems are
restorative or reconciliatory; his purpose is to show that the recognition of
indigenous legal systems complements the way that the Canadian criminal
justice system is moving — toward remedial measures and rehabilitation.
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He summarizes the series of reports and inquiries that recommended
changes to Canada’s sentencing process and argues that the recommended
changes complement indigenous legal systems’ approach to crime.59 I
point this out not because I oppose remedial measures or restorative
justice, but because characterizing indigenous traditions as oppositional to
the Canadian criminal justice system is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, equating indigenous culture and law with restorative justice
incorrectly conflates indigenous legal systems with Western notions of
restorative justice.60 Restorative justice allows for ideas of “diversion” or
“sentencing circles” to exist within the criminal justice system rather than
mandating the creation of a different criminal justice system for indigenous
people. Canadian criminal justice authorities, like police or Crown
prosecutors, decide who may be diverted or how the sentencing circle is
constituted. By conflating indigenous legal systems with the idea of
restorative justice that deals with indigenous offenders through diversion
in the Criminal Code’s process of sentencing, the criminal justice system
remains the site in which to negotiate indigenous cultural difference.
Indigenous communities must fit themselves into the spaces the criminal
justice system creates in sentencing and acquiesce to the same sentencing
process that historically appropriated indigenous identity for the purpose of
asserting sovereignty. The logic, procedures and language of sentencing
remain that of the state, with limited autonomy in the process for
indigenous people.
Second, it is also problematic to assume that a Dena or Inuit, or any
indigenous legal approach, currently exists separate and apart from the
experience of colonialism and criminal justice. In fact, to assume a conception and identification of any indigenous tradition separate and apart
from the experience of colonialism may not be possible. Emma Larocque
argues that “typologizing Aboriginal cultures results in gross generalizations, draws on stereotypes, reduces Aboriginal culture to a pitiful
handful of ‘traits’, and by oversimplifying, ends up infantilizing the very
cultures Aboriginal people are trying to build up in the eyes of colonizers”.61 Larocque makes an argument about gender that is a good example
of the problematic stereotyping that essentializing indigenous identity
creates. She argues that gender is often at the heart of what becomes typologized as indigenous tradition and that typologizing frequently creates
59
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new problems around gender and what is “authentically” indigenous. She
asserts that that notion of justice and the role of women in indigenous
societies in relation to criminal justice “is actually syncretized fragments
of Native and Western tradition which have become highly politicized
because they have been created from the context of colonization”.62
Larocque’s concern was in fact one brought to the attention of the
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in its consideration of
Bill C-41 by the Pauktuutit Inuit Women’s Association of Canada.63 The
way gender engages questions of culture serves as an example of the
problematic way that the dichotomized notions of “traditional” and
“Western” justice manifest themselves in public discourse about criminal
law as it affects indigenous people. Most troubling perhaps is that all
indigenous traditions become conflated in some vague way, not only with
restorative justice models, but also with each other. In the very effort to
create a more profound understanding with indigenous people and to make
up for colonialism’s legacy and law’s essentialization of indigenous identity,
a new essentialism emerges. The new essentialism comes with a different
legal language, but it remains part of the state’s effort to ameliorate the
circumstances of indigenous people.

V. CONCLUSION: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE “PERILS” OF
MAKING USE OF INDIGENOUS IDENTITY IN SENTENCING
Indigenous identity is a conundrum for criminal justice. That conundrum lies partly in the context in which indigenous identity has become a
part of our sentencing regime and partly in our expectations of what the
criminal justice system can achieve through sentencing. In
Ipeelee/Ladue, the Court is aware that sentencing is not a panacea for the
ills that indigenous communities suffer as a result of historical disadvantage and systemic discrimination. Nonetheless, the Court must act, and
its action directly affects indigenous people. As a result, it has tried to
develop an approach to action that could alleviate over-incarceration and
systemic discrimination against indigenous offenders, but that approach
also operates to construct indigenous identity. The law’s troubled legacy
of regulating indigenous difference is not eliminated; it merely takes a
different form. Criminal law continues to be a site of tension between
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indigenous people and the state. The claims of indigenous people for authority over the criminal justice system can only be articulated through
the logic and procedures of the Criminal Code. It is a logic for which
sentencing is particularly well suited, given its propensity to use an individual offender’s character and identity to determine the extent of
criminal responsibility, as well as its role in upholding the state’s authority. But sentencing is not well suited to the task of remedying the historic
disadvantage and systemic discrimination that indigenous people have
experienced.
What other options are available to criminal courts? Indeed, what
other avenues are available for indigenous people? What would lessen
the conundrum of the “perils of identity”64 that face criminal courts and
indigenous offenders in the sentencing process? One way to address the
conundrum courts face would be for the criminal justice system to acknowledge the way that sentencing has the power to essentialize
indigenous identity and exacerbate rather than alleviate the harm caused
by systemic discrimination and historical disadvantage. That acknowledgment would require practitioners engaged in the criminal justice
system to look closely at how they characterize indigenous offenders,
communities and indigenous legal perspectives. Reconciling ourselves to
the conundrum takes nothing away from the difficult and important work
of indigenous advocates in the criminal justice system. Instead, the acknowledgment would mean that advocacy must focus on better
community engagement, better systems for diversion and better resources for indigenous communities. Since Ipeelee/Ladue, there is a
renewed interest in the sentencing of indigenous offenders. For instance,
the University of Manitoba’s Faculty of Law has developed a “Gladue
Handbook” to assist judges and lawyers involved in sentencing indigenous offenders.65 Debra Parkes has questioned how the Supreme Court’s
emphasis on proportionality for indigenous offenders will conflict with
Parliament’s recent legislative amendments instituting mandatory minimum sentencing.66 Ipeelee/Ladue also supports arguments for giving
64
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specific consideration to the circumstances of indigenous offenders in
situations beyond sentencing, including extradition hearings, bail and
challenges to prosecutorial discretion.67 Although renewed focus on the
practicalities of sentencing indigenous offenders could result in better
resources for indigenous individuals or communities, sentencing would
remain a place where indigenous communities engage with the criminal
justice system, and criminal courts would still need to confront the conundrum of indigenous identity.
A more profound response to the conundrum would be to return to
the constitutional and socio-legal compromise that section 718.2(e)
represents, and to find a space within the criminal justice system for indigenous legal approaches other than the sentencing process. Indigenous
communities seek greater autonomy and control over the justice system
that governs them. That is the reason why indigenous identity matters in
sentencing. As such, it makes sense to consider whether a better approach to the conundrum lies in revisiting how our state deals with
indigenous claims to autonomy and self-governance. Addressing indigenous claims to self-governance means looking to the multiplicity,
diversity and richness of indigenous communities to find out what autonomy and self-governance means to them. It requires an ongoing
engagement within communities and within our constitutional and legal
institutions. It is a difficult task; however, it could be that within a constitutional response to the conundrum there is in fact a remedy for the
historic disadvantage and systemic discrimination indigenous people suffered and in which the criminal justice system is implicated.
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